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Civil Procedure: 




Personal jurisdiction—the adjudicatory authority of a court over a 
party—nominally has little directly to do with the ability of claims or 
parties to join together.  But recent decisions from the Supreme Court 
cabining the reach of courts’ personal jurisdiction over defendants—
including last Term’s bombshell Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior 
Court2—have imbued personal jurisdiction with a powerful 
disaggregation effect by requiring a close connection between the 
forum state, each defendant, and each claim.  The Court’s new 
restrictive approach to personal jurisdiction means that similarly 
situated plaintiffs injured in different states are unlikely to be able to 
sue codefendants from different states in the same lawsuit.  Even as 
against a single defendant, plaintiffs residing in the same state might 
not be able to join together in the same lawsuit if they were injured in 
different states.3  The resulting disaggregation causes waste and 
unfairness to the parties and the system.  In this chapter, I tell the story 
of personal jurisdiction and aggregation.  
 
The Law’s Preference for Aggregation 
 
Nearly everyone benefits in some form from aggregation.  Courts, 
plaintiffs, defendants, and witnesses alike benefit from increased 
efficiency, the avoidance of duplicative litigation, and consistency in 
judgments and precedent. 
The law thus prefers aggregation.  Joinder of claims under Rules 
13 and 18 are liberally permissive and sometimes even compulsory.4  
Joinder of parties under Rules 14, 19, 20, and 24 is likewise easy and 
sometimes mandatory.5  Federal law permits class actions and 
                                                 
 1. Summarized and excerpted from Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction 
and Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2018). 
 2. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 3. Plaintiffs could join together in the defendant’s home state, but only if 
the home state (or country, if the defendant is not a U.S. citizen) allows such 
aggregation. 
 4. FED. R. CIV. P. 13, 18. 
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 14, 19, 20, 24. 
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collective actions for efficient purposes.6  Principles of claim 
preclusion enforce these liberal-joinder norms.  The law even 
encourages consolidation of separate cases together for coordinated 
resolution, through Rule 42 or multidistrict litigation.7  Supplemental 
jurisdiction and other special statutes facilitate joinder by supplying 
broadened federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction.8 
Of course, aggregation is not an unalloyed good.  Aggregation can 
generate confusion, delay, and unfairness.  But for the most part, 
aggregation’s risks are minor compared to its upside.9  And the rules of 
aggregation already contain tools to mitigate its risks, by prioritizing 
only efficient joinder and enabling judicial discretion to disaggregate 
when warranted.10  The point here is that regulating the scope of 
aggregation on its own terms makes sense.  But recent decisions from 
the Supreme Court have drastically curtailed aggregation even though 
the decisions themselves address an issue having little to do with 
aggregation doctrinally: personal jurisdiction. 
 
The Turning of Personal Jurisdiction 
 
The story of personal jurisdiction is a tortuous one, but, until 2011, 
it was largely in tandem with the law’s preference for aggregation. 
Under general personal jurisdiction, plaintiffs could join together to sue 
a single defendant in any forum in which the defendant had continuous 
and systematic contacts, even if the plaintiffs’ claims arose in different 
states.11  And the combination of broad general jurisdiction, fairness-
based specific jurisdiction, and enhancement from the plaintiff’s forum 
contacts often enabled a plaintiff to find a common forum with personal 
                                                 
 6. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1407; FED. R. CIV. P. 42. 
 8. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (interpleader), 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). 
 9. Some parties strategically oppose aggregation for reasons unintended 
by the law.  Class-action defendants, for example, may oppose aggregation of 
plaintiffs because they suspect that many cases will be too costly for plaintiffs 
to litigate individually.  But the law rightly denies that such a reason is a 
legitimate basis to oppose aggregation; to the contrary, a primary goal of 
aggregation is to enable litigation that might be too inefficient or uneconomical 
to pursue individually. 
 10. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
 11. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, 
Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
207, 214 (2014). 
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jurisdiction over multiple opponents, thus facilitating joinder of 
defendants.12 
When a conflict between personal jurisdiction and aggregation did 
arise, the conflict was invariably resolved in favor of aggregation.  A 
plaintiff opposing a counterclaim was deemed to have consented to 
personal jurisdiction for that claim.13  Personal jurisdiction over class 
plaintiffs was relaxed to enable class certification.14  Congress 
expanded the statutory reach of federal court personal jurisdiction when 
necessary to enable joinder by interpleader.15  And lower courts 
adopted a doctrine of “pendent personal jurisdiction” to cover all 
related claims by a single plaintiff against a single defendant when 
some of the claims would subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction 
in the forum but others would not.16 
The story of personal jurisdiction—and of its relationship to 
aggregation—took an abrupt turn in 2011 with a series of cases that 
narrowed personal jurisdiction.  In a trio of general jurisdiction cases, 
the Court replaced the “continuous and systematic” test with the 
“essentially at home” test, which limits general jurisdiction to one (for 
individuals) or at most two (for corporations) states.17  And in a 
different trio of specific-jurisdiction cases, the Court required, for 
specific jurisdiction, a direct links among the forum, the defendant, and 
the claim,18 connections that limit the number of common forums in a 
case involving multiple parties or claims. 
These cases narrowing personal jurisdiction affect aggregation in a 
variety of ways.  The Court’s insistence on a connection between the 
                                                 
 12. E.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784–89 (1984). 
 13. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1938). 
 14. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 15. 28 U.S.C. § 2361. 
 16. See Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 
1180–81 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 17. BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017); Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 
564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 18. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) 
(holding that plaintiffs not harmed in California could not join with plaintiffs 
harmed in California to assert personal jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers Squibb 
in California for the same kinds of harm); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 
1122 (2014) (constraining specific jurisdiction to the contacts that the 
defendant—as opposed to the plaintiff—creates with the forum); J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (plurality) (demanding 
purposeful contacts by the defendant with the particular forum rather than with 
the United States as a whole). 
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claim and the forum calls into doubt the doctrine of pendent personal 
jurisdiction for claim joinder.  As for party joinder, plaintiffs seeking to 
join together as a class or under Rule 20 against a single defendant,19 or 
a plaintiff seeking to sue multiple defendants, will have more difficulty 
finding a common forum with personal jurisdiction for all claims—and 
there may be no common U.S. forum for a foreign defendant.20  And 
although case consolidation under the MDL statute is, according to the 
JPML, essentially immune from personal-jurisdiction strictures,21 
recent scholarship has challenged that assessment,22 meaning that the 
Court’s restrictive turn in personal jurisdiction may drastically limit 
MDL as well. 
 
Expanding Personal Jurisdiction for Aggregation  
 
The solution in federal court to these tensions between personal 
jurisdiction and aggregation is to expand the statutory or rule 
authorization for federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction in 
aggregation cases. 
The typical way for Congress or the rulemakers to establish the 
scope of personal jurisdiction in federal courts is through authorization 
of service of process.  The broadest grant of personal jurisdiction to 
federal courts would be to allow nationwide personal jurisdiction to the 
extent permitted by the Constitution over all parties and claims in a 
multiclaim or multiparty lawsuit.  This would give maximum flexibility 
for aggregation purposes by essentially removing all personal-
jurisdiction barriers to aggregation, with the possible exception of alien 
                                                 
 19. Class action joinder presents trickier issues than ordinary joinder 
because a class action exhibits some features of an independent entity.  See 
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969) (looking only to the named 
representatives’ citizenships for determining the citizenship of a non-CAFA 
class for diversity-jurisdiction purposes); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (specifying 
that the entire amount claimed by a CAFA class is the amount in controversy 
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction).  It is unclear how the Court’s new 
conception of specific jurisdiction applies to Rule 23 joinder. 
 20. See William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and 
Aliens, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1205 (2018) (“For alien defendants, by contrast, the 
likelihood is that no U.S. state will be able to exercise general jurisdiction.”). 
 21. In re FMC Corp. Patent Litig. 422 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (J.P.M.L. 
1976); In re Library Editions of Children’s Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139, 1141 
(J.P.M.L. 1969). 
 22. See Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1165 (2018); Scott Dodson, Plaintiff Personal 
Jurisdiction and Venue Transfer, 117 MICH. L. REV. (2019). 
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defendants whose connections to the United States are so attenuated 
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court would 
violate the Constitution. 
The breadth of this formulation could lead to some odd results 
from the perspective of personal jurisdiction.  For example, a single 
plaintiff from California could sue a single defendant from Oregon in 
Florida federal court for two claims arising in California; based solely 
on the presence of multiple claims, Florida would have personal 
jurisdiction despite the lack of any Florida connection to the parties or 
the claims. 
But even were such oddities to occur under the broad version of 
nationwide personal jurisdiction, they would be largely corrected by the 
venue statute,23 which would limit proper venue in the case above to a 
federal court in Oregon (where the defendant resides) or a federal court 
in California (where the claims arose).  For unusual cases that the 
venue statute does not catch, the venue-transfer statute will allow 
transfer to a more sensible forum.24  Plaintiffs could try to use 
nationwide personal jurisdiction to shop for particularly favorable state 
law,25 but the Constitution imposes limits on the application of the law 
of states with no connection to the dispute.26  And Congress could 
easily change the choice-of-law rules for venue transfer in this context 
to protect against unfair law-shopping. 
If national personal jurisdiction is unpalatable, more limited 
permutations are possible.  For example, the doctrine of pendent 
personal jurisdiction could be codified to allow a federal court to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant as to all claims asserted 
by a single plaintiff if the federal court has personal jurisdiction under 
Rule 4(k) as to at least one of those claims.  Or, personal jurisdiction 
could be expanded to track the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, 
effectively providing for personal jurisdiction whenever joinder is 
allowed by the rules and not prohibited by limitations of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, as long as personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k) is proper 
for one of the original claims.  Like the supplemental-jurisdiction 
statute, and consistent with the joinder-based protections against 
prejudice, such joinder-based personal jurisdiction could even be 
discretionary, such that a court could decline to exercise personal 
                                                 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
 25. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990). 
 26. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1980). 
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jurisdiction over a defendant for a particular claim if doing so would be 
unfair or intrude upon notions of interstate federalism. 
Any such expansion of personal jurisdiction exercised by federal 
courts would be constitutional.  Although the question of whether the 
Constitution permits federal courts to exercise nationwide personal 
jurisdiction has never been decided by the Supreme Court,27 the Court 
has hinted in the affirmative,28 and commentators nearly uniformly 
agree that the Constitution permits federal courts to exercise nationwide 
personal jurisdiction based upon a national-contacts test.29  After all, 
Congress already has provided for nationwide personal jurisdiction in 
federal court on a number of specified claims,30 some of which were 
specifically for purposes of facilitating joinder.31 
An important objection is that aggregation is already too liberal, 
and expanding personal jurisdiction will enable more opportunities for 
aggregation.  Even were that true, the appropriate way to address 
excessive aggregation is on aggregation’s own terms, not through a 
doctrine having little to do with aggregation.  The aggregation rules and 
statutes are up to the challenge of balancing the virtues and vices on 
their own; there is no need to complicate matters through the 
convoluted morass of personal jurisdiction. 
 
 
                                                 
 27. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 
(2017) (leaving “open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the 
same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court”); 
Omni Capital Int’l Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 103 n.5 (1987) 
(reserving the same question); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 
U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (plurality) (same). 
 28. See, e.g., Miss. Pub’g Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) 
(stating that “Congress could provide for service of process anywhere in the 
United States”); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. 300, 328 (1838) (stating that 
“Congress might have authorized civil process from any circuit court, to have 
run into any State of the Union”); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553-54 
(1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that the Fifth Amendment requires 
minimum contacts with the United States as a whole). 
 29. See, e.g., Dodge & Dodson, supra note 20 (calling this “an easy 
proposition”). 
 30. E.g., 9 U.S.C. § 9 (Federal Arbitration Act); 15 U.S.C. § 5 (Sherman 
Act); 15 U.S.C. § 22 (Clayton Act); 15 U.S.C. § 77v (Securities Act of 1933); 
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Securities Act of 1934); 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (RICO); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(e)(2) (ERISA); 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (CERCLA). 
 31. E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1397, 2361 (interpleader); FED. R. BANKR. P. 
7004(d), (f) (bankruptcy). 
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Conclusion 
 
A new restrictive turn in personal jurisdiction threatens the salutary 
benefits of aggregation in federal civil litigation.  The solution is for 
Congress or the rulemakers to authorize expanded personal jurisdiction 
for aggregation cases.  Such an effort would be constitutional and 
consistent with the spirit of the federal rules of joinder. 
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